Does existing inequality hinder redistributive policies that aim to help the poor? This paper answers this question in the context of a widely used redistributive policy in developing countriespublic works schemes. Using district-level data on land ownership distribution and the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India, I nd robust evidence that the concentration of land ownership reduces public works provision. This relationship could be explained by a mechanism through which public works schemes raise agricultural wages in the private labor market, thereby incentivizing big landlords to use their political power to oppose this program. To address the potential endogeneity due to unobservables and measurement error, I leverage a historical institution in India, the land revenue collection system established by British colonial rulers during 1750-1861, to construct an instrumental variable for land inequality. Due to the concentration of post-independence land reforms enacted in landlord-dominated areas, those areas have lower land inequality today than the previously non-landlord dominated areas. The IV estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in land inequality (as measured by Gini coecient) would lead to a 3-6 percent decrease in public job provision. The results are robust to using the alternative measurements of land inequality and public works implementation.
Introduction
Does inequality lead to more or less redistributive eorts to the poor? This question has been studied extensively using theoretical models, with the earlier literature suggesting a positive association (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) and the more recent literature suggesting a negative association (e.g. Benabou, 2000; Galor et al., 2009) . The empirical evidence is relatively lacking in identifying the direction of the eect and the mechanisms through which inequality might aect redistributive policy, with a few exceptions (e.g. Boustan et al., 2013; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Ramcharan, 2010) .
The inequality of land ownership is an important form of inequality, as land was the main production factor before the industrial economy and to this day in many developing countries. Furthermore, the distribution of land is directly linked to the concentration of political power. This power gravitates towards landlords, who may either inuence tenants' votes or directly inuence politicians in the direction benecial to themselves. The literature has provided evidence that large landlord elites inuence the political process to prevent economic reforms or redistributive policies, such as educational expenditure (Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Ramcharan, 2010) , human-capital accumulation (Galor et al., 2009) , general social assistance programs (Anderson et al., 2015) and public goods (Beg, 2016) .
In line with these recent studies, this paper assesses the relationship between land inequality and redistribution under another widely used redistributive policypublic work schemes, which, due to their complexity in design and implementation, warrant special attention. A public works program is the provision of employment at a prescribed wage for those unable to nd alternative employment by the creation of public infrastructure projects, such as transport infrastructure (e.g. roads, railroads and canals) and public services (e.g. sewage and dams). It is nanced by the government and functions as a form of social safety net in many developing countries, such as India, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Chile (Subbarao, 1997) . The provision of public jobs raises agricultural wages in the private labor market (Imbert and Papp, 2015) , thereby incentivizing big landlords to use their political power to oppose this program. India is the perfect context in which to study the relationship between land inequality and the provision of public works, because it has the world's largest public works program the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (hereafter, NREGA) and is faced with a historical tension arising from land inequality.
In this paper, I compare district (within-state) variations of land ownership inequality and public works provision, using census data on district-level land distribution in 2005 and data on the imple-mentation of the NREGA program since its inauguration in 2006. Land inequality is measured by the Gini coecient. The provision of public employment is measured by four dimensions: the fraction of rural households provided with employment, per capita labor expenditure, average days of employment provided per person in either Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe (thereafter, SC/ST) and the total number of completed works per rural person. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates suggest that a 1 percent dierence in the Gini coecient of land ownership leads to a 0.6-1 percent gap in NREGA provision.
To address the potential endogeneity arising from measurement errors and omitted variables in the OLS estimation, I use a historical institution as the instrumental variable for land inequalitythe land revenue collection system established by British colonial rulers during 1750-1861. This variable derives from the study on the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) .
Despite a higher Gini coecient of land ownership inequality in landlord-dominated areas during , such historically unequal areas enacted more frequent land reforms after Indian independence and are now among the more equal areas. Therefore, the rst-stage conditional correlations suggest that landlord-dominated districts have signicantly lower land ownership inequality in 2005. Under the assumption that the instrument is exogenous, the IV estimates conrm the negative eect of land ownership inequality on public works schemes. 2SLS estimates suggest that a 1% dierence in the Gini coecient of land ownership leads to a 3-6 % gap in NREGA provision. To examine the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion condition, I construct bounds for the 2SLS estimates following Conley et al. (2012) . The negative eect still holds when relaxing the exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable by allowing a negative association between the instrument variable and NREGA provision and a slight positive relation between these two variables.
Both OLS and IV results are robust when using the alternative measurement of land inequality the share of land owned by the top 10% largest land holdings, which more directly captures the top distribution and hence large farmers' political power. Finally, I exclude the possibility that the higher provision of public jobs in more equal areas is due to a higher demand for public jobs, by showing these more equal areas have higher agricultural wages in the private sector. To make sense of the results, compare two districts A and B with similar socio-economic characteristics. If district A's land Gini Coecient is 1% (equivalent to 0.0047 in absolute terms) larger than that in district B, then district A will have 5% fewer households provided with NREGA jobs; per capita NREGA labor expenditure in district A will be 4% lower than that in district B; each person in Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe in district A will on average work 3% fewer days than those from district B; the total number of works per rural person completed in district A will be 6% lower than that in district B.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to link district-level heterogeneity in the provision of NREGA jobs to the inequality of land ownership, a proxy for political power. NREGA claims to provide 100 days of working opportunity to each rural household in need of jobs. As a matter of fact, however, there is an un-met demand for jobs in almost all districts and the extent of un-met demand diers by districts. Existing literature has been trying to explain this heterogeneity of NREGA implementation mostly in terms of political incentives and administrative capacity (Gulzar and Pasquale, 2016; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013; Nath, 2015; Gupta and Mukhopadhyay, 2016; Sheahan et al., 2016) , and of the political reservation system (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Bose and Das, 2015) . This study adds to the understanding of the heterogeneity of NREGA implementation by proposing the mechanism that big farmers use their political power to block wage-increasing public works schemes. Indeed, there is abundant anecdotal evidence showing that big farmers lobby to suspend the provision of NREGA employment (e.g. Maiorano, 2014) , but broad-based quantitative testing of this notion has not been attempted previously. 1 Investigating the question of land inequality and public works provision adds to the understanding of Indian land inequality which, as a legacy of British colonial institutions, has been a historically important and intricate issue. The relationship between landlords and the landless aects dierent aspects of rural life and shapes the eectiveness of public policies. There has been a large number of land reforms since Indian independence, but after all those land reforms, the share of land occupied by the top 10% biggest farmers is still about 46%. This paper shows that the concentration of land ownership, hence political power, is a hurdle to redistributive eorts and successful anti-poverty policies, and oers a potential justication for further eorts at land reform. Moreover, compared to the estimates derived using soil or other geographic information as instrumental variables, the IV estimates in the current paper are particularly policy relevant because the lower levels of land inequality seem to be driven by land reforms (rather than natural conditions). 2 This paper speaks to the general discussion of inequality and public expenditures. The literature nds a detrimental eect of early inequality on the emergence of human-capital accumulating and 1 In studying clientilism between landlords and the landless in Indian villages, Anderson et al. (2015) show land-owning elites prefer weak provision of centrally funded pro-poor programs such as the Employment Guarantee Program. The current paper diers from their paper in at least three respects. First, their survey data is restricted to 3 regions in Maharashtra state, while the current study uses nationally representative data. Second, they proxy landlords' political power by the proportions of land in the village dominated by the upper caste, Maratha. I use the concentration of land ownership, which goes beyond the constraint of caste backgrounds and have more general implications. Third, It is believed that NREGA has incorporated the lessons and successes of EGS, with broader goals and better implementation.
2 Although there is a big debate on the eective implementation of land reforms, the literature has found that land reforms reduce land inequality (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Besley et al., 2016). growth-promoting institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sokolo and Engerman, 2000; Galor et al., 2009) . The main mechanism observed in the literature is that land concentration induces landowners to use political power to assure lower public expenditure in education, for fear that higher public education investment would raise labor costs or generate migration from the agricultural sector to industrial sector. This mechanism also applies in the context of public works schemes. Providing public employment to the landless and the marginal farmers will increase labor wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015) , and this wage eect will incentivize landlord elites to oppose the implementation of the public works schemes (Anderson et al., 2015; Maiorano, 2014) . This paper also broadly speaks to the literature on inequality, redistribution and economic growth.
This literature initially argues that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth-retarding redistributive policies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) . Under democratic societies, if the median voter is poorer than the average voter, then the majority vote will lead to high tax rates and more redistribution to the poor, which impedes investment and economic growth. This mechanism is supported by some existing literature (Boustan et al., 2013) . However, the current paper, coupled with other recent empirical evidence (e.g Galor et al., 2009; Ramcharan, 2010) , casts doubt on this underlying mechanism. In contrast, the evidence suggests that inequality is a hurdle for redistribution, provided that the landlords, or better-endowed agents, have sucient political power to inuence redistribution policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the background information on NREGA, highlighting the necessary facts that make it possible for landlords to play a role in the provision of NREGA jobs. Section 3 discusses the mechanism of how land inequality aects public works provision. Section 4 discusses data issues. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and principal ndings, followed by robustness checks relaxing the perfect exogeneity restriction and using alternative measurements of the NREGA implementation and land inequality. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
Demand-Driven Nature of NREGA Employment
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 created the right to work for all households in rural India through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. It was a three-phased nation-wide rollout, with 199 districts in Phase 1 (Feb 2006) , 128 districts in Phase 2 (April 2007) and the remaining 261 districts in Phase 3 (April 2008). By 2008, it reached all districts in India. It is the largest public works program in the world so far and asserts guaranteeing 100 days of working opportunity for each household per nancial year (June-May). Households need to obtain job cards from the local governments, which are used to record work done and payment. According to the Act, as long as an eligible household les applications for jobs, the local government must provide employment within 15 days and within 5 kilometers of the applicant's home. Otherwise, states are liable to pay unemployment allowances. However, in practice there are still frictions in the implementation leading to some unmet demand, such that those wanting work do not get it in a timely manner.
More than half of the works are related to water conservation, with other types of works including irrigation provision, land development and rural connectivity. Wages are to be paid at the statutory minimum wage rates, which makes this program a means of enforcing minimum wage laws. The wage rate is job specic rather than gender specic, as opposed to the private labor market where women earn a much lower wage rate than men. Therefore, NREGA jobs are especially appealing for women.
As a social insurance tool, NREGA has a stronger demand in backward areas with poor agricultural conditions, such as bad soil and weather. For instance, Santangelo (2016) nds workers resort to NREGA to a larger extent when the local economy is hit by negative agricultural productivity shocks.
Financing NREGA and the Supply Constraint
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act incentivises States to provide employment by stating that 100 percent of the unskilled labor cost and 75 percent of the material cost of the program is borne by the central government. The labor to material ratio could vary from 90:10 to 60:40.
The overall annual labor spending on NREGA at state/district/ block/ village level is a predetermined cap. Labor budget for each nancial year is determined in the previous year, following a bottom-up process from the village level to the state level and last to the central government (NREGA Operational Guidelines, 2013) . This budget plan includes (i) the anticipated quantity of demand for jobs in the next year (ii) the precise timing of the demand for work and (iii) a listing of projects to be prepared and prioritized to meet job demand. Table 1 presents the various steps involved in the preparation and nalization of annual labor budgets. Because the labor budget is an estimation and NREGA is a demand driven program, the Act states that the States may, based on actual performance, come back to the Ministry any time during the year and request revision of their existing labor budget, following the procedures in Table 1 . However, in fact, the exibility is limited. Once the labor budget is nalized, the maximum supply of jobs by each state/district/block government will not be changed for the next nancial year.
Therefore, there will be a shortage of supply for NREGA jobs if any of the following cases occurs (i) an exogenously xed maximum level of spending on NREGA by the center government; (ii) an underestimation of job demand in the budget planning; (iii) a poor timing of job demand; and other cases. The actual implementation is further complicated by states' constraints in organizing projects and workers. Even if the budget planning is not an issue, accommodating supply to demand could still be a challenge because of the incapability to meet the relatively skilled labor requirements at the local level, such as panchayat technical assistants (Dutta et al., 2014) . As a result, although the NREGA program is designed to be a demand-driven program, there is an un-met demand for jobs in almost all states (Dutta et al., 2014) . On average, each household works roughly 35 person-days per nancial
year, far less than the claimed 100 days. The extent of the un-met demand diers by districts and by time.
Landlords and NREGA Employment
In addition to supply constraints in implementing the NREGA, landlords could also aect the supply of public jobs. Providing public jobs to the landless and marginal farmers will increase labor wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015) , which will potentially increase production costs for landlords who hire casual laborers. Thus this wage eect brings landlords an economic incentive to oppose the implementation of NREGA (Anderson et al., 2015; Maiorano, 2014) . There are at least two stages where big landlords can intervene the process of providing NREGA jobs.
First, at the stage of making the labor budget, landlords may lobby against a budget plan that provides enough jobs to the rural poor. As Table 1 shows, budget planning is a bottom-up decision making process. The demand for NREGA jobs and the shelf of projects are rst identied at the Gram Panchayat level, then the demand and supply are consolidated at the block level, and further aggregated at the district and state levels. The fact that lower level governments such as block and village have a substantial discretion in this process renders big landlords' inuence very likely. It is after all easier for landlords to lobby village governments than state governments.
Second, even after labor budget is made, big farmers can still use their political power to block the implementation, such as delaying work assignment, payment and some complementary machinery (see Maiorano (2014) for anecdotal evidence of lobbying). As a result, as NREGA annual report shows, the nal work completed is smaller than the original budget.
Mechanism
The political mechanism of inequality and redistribution has been established by the literature. Higher inequality lowers the level of awareness of the poor, decreasing the level of their political participation (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Ramcharan, 2010) . Meanwhile, greater inequality can concentrate the benets of political participation and simplify the collective action problem among the landed, which leads to a higher and more eective political participation among the landed elites. In the cases that the landlord elites are net losers from redistribution, they would block redistribution.
Therefore, a higher land inequality predicts lower redistributions to the poor.
As the primary interest of this paper lies in economic eects rather than political eects, I will impose a crude political mechanism under which landlords have sucient political power against redistributive policies. Instead, I will focus on the economic incentives that lead big landlords to oppose the provision of public employment.
Providing public jobs to the poor introduces competition for labor between the public works schemes and the rural private employers. The literature has found that the introduction of NREGA increases rural casual labor wages by 6 percent (Imbert and Papp, 2015) . This wage eect could potentially reduce landlords' prot, if they keep hiring casual labor. Therefore, the wage-increasing nature of public works schemes provides big landlords the economic incentives to oppose the program.
Data

Land Inequality
District-wise data on land ownership distribution in 2005 come from the Indian Agricultural Census (excluding Maharashtra), conducted every ve years. The census information is collected on operational land holdings rather than owned land holdings, 3 but the fact that the wholly owned and self-operated holdings accounted for 97.14 percent of the total agricultural land makes this data set a good approximation of land ownership distribution (Page 29, Agriculture Census Report, 2005) .
This dataset has information on the number and area of operational holdings across the following size bins (in 1000 hectares): below 0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4; 4-5; 5-7.5; 7.5-10; 10-20; 20 & above. 4 I use 3 According to Agriculture Census in India, an Operational holder is the person who has the responsibility for the operation of the agricultural holding and who exercises the technical initiative and is responsible for its operation. An operational unit could include multiple plots. The operated areas comprise of i) Land owned and self operated; ii) Land leased in; iii) Land otherwise operated. 4 I use the information on Sub-total land holdings, including both individual holding and joint holdings, to measure district level land distribution. The ratio of joint holdings to individual holdings is, 1:6.5 in terms of numbers and 1:5 in terms of areas (Agriculture census report 2005, page 121). Land operated by institutions constituted less than 0.5% of the average size of land holdings in each bin to construct land ownership Gini coecient. The rst row of Table 3 shows, the average Gini coecient in our sample districts is 0.47. Figure 1 provides statewise average Gini coecients in 2005. Figure 2 provides the shares of operated areas by each decile of holdings. The largest 10 percent of operational holders operate about 46 percent of total agricultural land in India. Figure A. 2 in Appendix plots the probability distributions of Gini coecients. 5 4.2 NREGA Implementation NREGA implementation data come from public data portal 6 . Phases are determined based on the ranking of Backwardness Index (Zimmermann, 2012) . I extract this index and its ve components from Indian Planning Commission 2003 Report, including agricultural wages in 1996, agricultural productivity per person 1990-93, agricultural productivity per hectare 1990-93, ratio of SC/ST in the population from 1991 census and poverty ratio 1994 (Commission et al., 2003) . I motivate this paper by observing substantial heterogeneity of NREGA implementations across districts. Therefore, it's important to show variations of both NREGA and land inequality across the total area, and is excluded from the data. 5 There is another relevant fact that supports the legitimacy of using the concentration of land holdings to proxy for landlords' political power. According to Agriculture Census Report, 2005 (Page 34), about 96.0 percent of the operational holdings and 94.7 percent of operated areas were operated by village residents whose entire area of land holdings was locating in the village of his residence. These high ratios reduce the concern that big landlords, whose land is in the village but who themselves live outside of the village, might not have the political power to aect NREGA in the current village. 6 mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/dynamic2/dynamicreport_new4.aspx 7 This online document nicely presents the phase-in progress http : //nrega.nic.in/M N REGA_Dist.pdf Figure 4 visually presents a negative relation between land inequality and public works provision by doing a kernel regression of the shares of households provided with public jobs on the share of land occupied by top 10% biggest farms.
Demographic and Geographic Information
District proles are downloaded from the 2001 population census, including caste composition, employment and industry structure, literacy rate, amenities and infrastructural facilities, district area size and so on. Population between 2001 and 2010 are lled using these two years' census data, assuming a growth rate equal to that during 1991-2001. Table 3 presents summary statistics of district-wise demographic information in 2005.
The monthly rainfall data are obtained from Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware.
Indian agricultural year is split into two distinct seasons: wet season (from June to November) and dry season (from December to May). Existing studies document that NREGA participation is strongly associated with rainfall shocks in wet season. Therefore, I compute wet season precipitation by aggregating the amount of precipitation between June and November in the study year. Figure I map geographical coordinates to district level soil texture. Table 3 shows that 91% of the land contains medium or ne level soil; 9% of land is covered by course soil.
Compiling these data sets into a district-wise panel is complicated by district jurisdictional changes during 2001-2011. There were 640 districts in 2011, as opposed to 593 districts in 2001 (Census, 2011) .
In the analysis, districts with boundary changes are excluded, although results are robust to adding these districts back. The nal sample includes 416 districts at 2001 district level. 8 8 This seemingly much smaller number relevant to total Indian districts is a consequence of combining dierent data sources, each of which has some missing districts. First, 2005 Agriculture Census only contains 528 districts (as Maharashtra state is not included), about 90 of which are either newly created or the original districts that got split.
These 90 districts are dropped when I combine Agriculture census to 2001 population census. Second, 26 districts that are included in Agriculture census are not included in NREGA public portal (and this public portal posts information at 2010 district level). Third, about 10 districts lack information on soil quality or rural area size etc that further reduces the number of observations. In the end, we have 416 districts for each year at 2001 district level.
Empirical Model and Results
OLS Results
I examine the eect of land inequality on public works provision by pooling the NREGA implementation data during 2006-2010 and using across district (within-state) variations of land concentration in 2005. 9
The model specication is: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010} (1) where β is the coecient of interest.
Y it denotes the implementation of the NREGA program in district i in year t, measured by proportions of rural households provided with NREGA employment (in logarithm). A negative sign of β means NREGA job provision is negatively associated with land inequality. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
To identify the eect of the concentration of land ownership on public works provision, β, I need to control for variables that are correlated with land inequality and at the same time aect NREGA implementation. The rst set of confounding factors contains the capacity of local governments to accommodate job supply to job demand. As mentioned in the previous section, although central government bears most of the cost, it does not imply there will be zero cost to local governments when employing workers under NREGA. The implementation cost may be particularly high in poor districts (Dutta et al., 2014) . Therefore, I control for variables reecting the level of local economic development to capture local governments' accommodation capability, such as the percentage of villages that have access to drinking water, electricity, paved road and schools in the district and other rural infrastructure variables.
In the same vein, I also control for Backwardness Index, a score constructed by the Indian planning commission in 2003, with smaller numbers meaning being more backward. The literature has shown that NREGA program rolls out from backward districts to more auent districts, in the order of their rankings on this index (Zimmermann, 2012; Dasgupta et al., 2017) . However, this roll-out rule is not absolutely enforced, reected by the fact that many Phase 2 districts have smaller values of backwardness index than Phase 1 districts. Therefore, I also include phase dummies to capture the heterogeneous implementation by phases.
9 Table A .2 shows that land distribution didn't change at statistically signicant level during 2005 and 2010. In addition, the model also includes soil texture and the current wet season's rainfall deviations from historical means, because these geographic variables could aect both the demand for and the supply of NREGA jobs, and are also documented to be associated with land distribution. 10 I also include a vector of state dummy, D state , and year dummy, D t , restricting the cross-sectional comparisons to within-state variations.
The results of OLS estimates are presented in Table 4 . It gives a signicantly negative relation between Gini coecient and the proportion of rural households provided with NREGA employment.
The results are robust to adding extra covariates. Column 4 suggests, districts with a 1% (or in absolute term, 0.0047) higher Gini coecient would have 0.6% (or in absolute term, 0.006 * 30=1.8 percentage points) fewer households provided with NREGA jobs.
Addressing Endogeneity
OLS estimates cannot be interpreted as causal. The most apparent threat is reverse causality, as redistributive policies such as public works schemes also shape inequality. Using land inequality in 2005 (much ahead of the initiation of NREGA) allows for some control of potential reverse causality (i.e. it's reasonable that land inequality in 2005 will aect public work provision in post-2006, but unlikely that public works in post-2006 will aect land inequality in 2005). However, the model will still capture some endogeneity issues if there are some omitted variables which are correlated with both land ownership and the demand/supply side of NREGA implementation. For instance, adverse geographical and climatic characteristics may concentrate land ownership by reducing the demand for land by marginal farmers 10 ; and meanwhile adverse geographical and climatic characteristics may increase the demand for NREGA jobs and decrease the government capability to supply jobs. Although I have included the covariates of soil texture and rainfall variations, if there are other such geographical and climatic variables omitted, OLS estimates will be biased (upward and toward zero in the given example). In addition to omitted variable bias, there is also measurement error of land distribution, which will lead to the attenuation bias of the estimates. I address the endogeneity issues by taking advantage of historical institutions in Indiaa land revenue collection system established by British colonial rulers during 1750-1861. This variable is 10 This relation between geographic and climate information and land ownership distribution is established by existing studies that use various geographical conditions to instrument for land inequality, including climatic information, soil quality and the share of cash crop (inequality-rising) and wheat/rice crop etc. (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Sokolo and Engerman, 2000; Galor et al., 2009; Ramcharan, 2010; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Baten and Juif, 2014) . The spirits of these IVs are, small farmers are usually less able to hedge against negative weather shocks, and have a smaller demand for land in areas with poor soil quality (or in areas with violent rainfall variability). Thus, regions with poorer soil quality (or more rain variability) have higher land concentration. constructed based on the study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) . Land revenue, or land tax, was the major source of government revenue in India and during British times as well. The British administration established three systems to collect land revenue in all cultivable land in British India: (a) landlord-based system, where the liability for a village or a group of villages lay with with a single landlord; (b) an individual cultivator-based system, where revenue settlements was made directly with individual cultivators; (c) village-based system, where village bodies which jointly owned the village were responsible for the land revenue. Figure A. 3 in the appendix presents the map of these three dierent land revenue systems in British India. System (c), village-based system, could be further grouped as either system (a) or (b), depending on whether the village body was a single landlord or a large number of members with each person being responsible for a xed share of the revenue. Table 5 presents state-wise distribution of landlord and non-landlord districts.
To identify a causal relation between land distribution and the provision of public works under NREGA, I use the binary indicator of land revenue systemwhether this district was a landlord district in British Indiato instrument for land inequality in 2005. The instrumental variable strategy relies on the assumption that land revenue collection system under British India only aects redistributive policies through contemporary and current land inequality, after controlling for all observables. This is plausible because the way that British colonial rulers decided land revenue system in dierent areas was not based on a hard rule, i.e. in terms of land fertility, weather or labor productivity (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005) . Figure 5 visually presents the negative relation between landlord-dominated revenue collection system and current land inequality. I estimate rst stage relation using the following equation:
where Z i is the binary indicator that equals to 1 if district i used to be a landlord-dominated district in British India, and zero otherwise; IN E i,2005 denotes land inequality in district i in 2005, measured by Gini coecient; X i denotes the same vector of district-wise covariates as in Equation(1). 11
The rst-stage conditional correlations suggest that landlord-dominated districts have 7.4% lower Gini land ownership inequality in 2005 (Table 6 ). This estimated eect is equivalent to -0.035 (= -7.4% * 0.47) in absolute term of gini coecient, or 0.5 (=0.035/0.08) standard deviation of Gini coecient, 11 By restricting the variations to be within-state, in this IV estimation, states where land tenure systems don't vary across districts within the state will be absorbed in the state xed eects, such as Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and West Bengal. As a result, 91 districts in 6 states are left and contribute to the variations in the IV estimation.
considering that the mean and standard deviation of Gini coecient are respectively 0.47 and 0.08 in the sample.
The rst-stage result that previously landlord-dominated districts in British India has a lower land inequality today is consistent with the study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) . They show that states with a higher landlord proportion had higher Gini measures of land ownership inequality in 1885, and this inequality persisted until the end of the colonial period 12 . However, as they argue, major landlorddominated states enacted 6.5 land reforms in the period between 1957-1992, while non-landlord states had an average of 3.5. According to Besley and Burgess (2000) , states that enacted a larger number of land reforms had a greater decline of Gini coecient of land inequality. Therefore, with this chain of reasoning, landlord district saw a greater decline of land inequality than non-landlord districts, driven by a great number of land reforms after Indian Independence. Furthermore, the negative sign of rst-stage results is consistent with the study by (Besley et al., 2016) that shows in the long-run land inequality is lower in areas that saw greater intensity of tenancy reform.
I then plot the numbers of land reforms over time in major landlord and non-landlord states in The instrumental variable strategy relies on the assumption that land revenue collection system 12 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) explains why the choice of landlord revenue system had a strong eect on the distribution of land and wealth in British India period. Under landlord-based systems, the landlords were given a more or less free hand to set the terms for the tenants and, as a result, they were in a position to appropriate most of the gains in productivity.
13 I calculate these two series of numbers by combining state-wise land reform data from (Besley and Burgess, 2000) into the current district-wise sample. Major landlord-dominated areas are states with an above-median share of districts belonging to landlord dominated districts.
14 Ideally, I need district-wise land inequality to plot the changes of land inequality over time in landlord versus nonlandlord districts. However, the lack of district-wise land distribution data prevents me from doing so. Instead, by combining with state-wise data on land reform and land distribution from Besley and Burgess (2000) , I plot these trends for major landlord states and non-landlord states, where landlord states are dened as states with an above-median share of districts belonging to landlord dominated districts, and non-landlord states.
under British India only aects redistributive policies through contemporary and current land inequality, after controlling for observables. However, if dierent historical property rights institutions lead to persistent unobserved culture and institutional outcomes, and such unobserved outcomes are also correlated with redistributive policies, then this IV would violate the exclusion condition. I will examine the sensitivity of the estimations to the degree in which the exclusion restriction is potentially violated using sensitivity analysis proposed in Conley et al. (2012) . Restricting the sample to the IV sample, column 1 shows OLS results with a full set of control variables, as a reference to 2SLS estimates. It suggests that a 1% increase in gini coecient of land ownership is associated with a 1.7% (or equivalent to 0.5 percentage points, given that the average share of households provided with NREGA jobs is 30%) decrease of the share of households provided with NREGA jobs. Column 2-5 present IV estimates with dierent sets of covariates added. Firststage F statistics are all above 10, suggesting a rejection of weak instrument null hypothesis. The size of the point estimate for the Gini coecient is relatively stable over the last four IV specications, suggesting that a 1% increase in gini coecient of land ownership would have decreased the share of households provided with NREGA jobs by 5% (or equivalent to 1.5 percentage points, given that the average share of households provided with NREGA jobs is 30%).
IV Results
Column 3 in Table 7 adds various variables that reect the demand for and the supply of NREGA jobs. It suggests soil quality and some rural infrastructure are negatively associated with public works provision. For instance, a 1% higher proportion of land covered by ne soil rather than coarse soil in the district is associated with a 2% lower participation by households. Similarly, a 1% higher proportion of villages having access to post and telephone facility is associated with a 1% lower participation by households. Such evidence is consistent the demand-driven nature of NREGA areas with favorable agricultural conditions may not need the job protection by NREGA, because there are already enough jobs in rural labor market. The negative relation may also be because the central government allocates less public employment in those relatively better endowed and more developed areas.
Column 3 also contains two Phase indicators, using Phase 1 as the reference group. The estimated coecients of Phase 2 and Phase 3 indicator are both negative, with the former having a smaller magnitude than the latter. This suggests that Phase 1 districts have the highest level of public employment provided, followed by Phase 2 districts and then Phase 3 districts. This relative position resonates with the fact that NREGA rolls out from the most backward districts to richer districts.
Column 4 replaces Phase dummies with Backwardness Index, which captures how the program was rolled out. Column 5 adds both Phase dummies and Backwardness Index. Backwardness Index (a greater value indicating economically more developed) is expected to be negatively related to job provision, because more NREGA jobs are demanded in backward areas. However, both column 4 and column 5 suggest a positive relation between this index and NREGA job provision, although not at a statistically signicant level. This positive relation may be because the higher demand in the backward areas is dominated by the lower capacity to accommodate NREGA projects. In addition, the magnitude of the estimated eect of land inequality on NREGA provision is slightly bigger in column 5 than that in column 3.
To put these results into perspective, consider the dierence between land inequality Gini coecient in two districts in Uttar Pradesh, Ballia and Allahabad. In Ballia, gini coecient of land ownership was 0.486 (which is at the 50th percentile of the distribution of gini coecient) in 2005, and in Allahabad, this number is 0.519 (which is at the 80th percentile). Using the estimates in column (5), the dierence of 0.033 points, or 6.6% (= 0.033/0.518), in gini coecient implies that 33% (=6.6 * 5 % ) more households would have been provided with NREGA jobs in Allahabad if it had a land gini coecient as small as Bellia's. Considering the shares of households provided with NREGA jobs are, respectively, 22 percent in Bellia and 12 percent in Allahabad, this 33% increase would have eliminated one third (=33% * 12 / (22-12)) of the actual gap in job allocation rates between these two districts.
Both OLS and 2SLS estimations suggest a negative relation between land inequality and NREGA provision. In terms of the magnitude, 2SLS coecient is about 3.8 times the OLS coecient, suggesting that OLS results are biased upward (toward nding zero eect). A simple and possible source of endogeneity that leads to the upward bias of OLS results is measurement error in land ownership distributions. As I approximate the size of land by the average size of land holdings in the size bin it belongs to, it unavoidably creates noise. Another source of bias might be some omitted variables that lead to less job provision in more equal areas. The three-times dierence between IV estimates and OLS estimates is also in line with other studies that use geographical conditions to instrument for land inequality (Easterly, 2007; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016; Ramcharan, 2010) .
It's noted that I take the logarithm of the dependent variable and gini coecient of land ownership so that the estimated eect can be easily interpreted as percent changes. This is especially convenient when we compare estimates across dierent measurements of NREGA implementation in the robustness check section. The disadvantage of taking logarithm lies in losing more than 100 observations that have zero NREGA jobs provided, most of which are Phase 2 and Phase 3 districts before 2007. Therefore, to address the concern that the estimated results may be driven by sample selections, I use level regressions which will include districts that have zero NREGA jobs provided as well. The estimates are provided in Table A .3 in the Appendix. The level of dependent variable and gini coecient here are standardized by the standard deviation of the sample observations. Column 5 suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase of gini coecient is associated with 0.7 standard deviation decline of the share of households provided with NREGA jobs.
6 Robustness of the Identication
Robustness to Violations of Perfect Exogeneity
The credibility of 2SLS estimations rests on the identication assumption that the historical institution of landlord versus non-landlord dominated areas does not directly relate to the provision of public works other than through land distribution. However, this instrument variable may only be plausibly exogenous rather than perfectly exogenous. To gain a sense about the sensitivity of the estimated eect to the relaxation of perfect exogeneity conditions, I examine the bounds that we can place on the true eect of land inequality on public works provision, following the method proposed by Conley et al. (2012) . This method has been used in other studies to examine the sensitivity of estimation results to the violations of exogeneity conditions (e.g. Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ding et al., 2009 ). This method relaxes IV exclusion restriction by allowing the instrument variable to also enter linearly in the second-stage regression with a coecient γ 15 . Conley et al. (2012) show how to obtain the bounds for the IV estimate of the eect of interest (in the current paper, the eect of land inequality on public works provision, β) with prior information or assumptions about γ.
Applying the Union of intervals approach proposed by Conley et al. (2012) to the current paper, 15 The following equation is a generalization of this method proposed by Conley et al. (2012) .
where γ reects how close the exclusion restriction is satised. Without prior information or assumptions about γ, the parameters β and γ can not be jointly identied. The IV exclusion restriction is equivalent to the prior belief that γ = 0. The denition of plausible exogeneity is having prior information that implies γ is near 0 but perhaps not exactly 0. I nd that if γ < 0, the bounds of β are actually further away from zero relative to the IV estimate of β which assumes perfect exogeneity (i.e. γ = 0). In other words, if landlord-dominated areas are still associated with less NREGA employment even after controlling for all covariates (which is likely if we regard public work projects as one kind of public investments and follow the argument by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) that landlord areas have lower public expenditures today), then IV estimates provide an underestimation (in terms of absolute value) of the true eect of land inequality on NREGA job provision.
Applying the same Union of intervals approach, I nd that if γ > 0, the bounds of β will be closer toward zero relative to the IV estimate of β, and therefore IV estimates provide an overestimation (in terms of the magnitude) of the true eect. In other words, if landlord-dominated areas are still associated with more public employment even after controlling for all covariates, then IV estimates provide an overestimation (in terms of absolute value) of the true eect of land inequality on NREGA job provision. A such example is that the relatively backward landlord areas have a higher demand for public jobs for reasons not captured by the model. Figure 8 plots 95% condence intervals for an array of assumptions about prior information of γ the support of γ is assumed to be [0, δ]. Because no distribution about the prior information is assumed in Union of intervals approach, this approach provides a conservative estimate of the bounds. For the 95% condence interval of β to include zero, γ must be above 0.2. Now the question is, how likely will γ be above 0.2? I was trying to estimate γ by extracting a subsample which has the same level of land inequality and then regressing Y on Z and all other covariates. However, the small sample nature of the data set in this paper doesn't support this estimation.
To gain a deeper insight on the direction of the potential bias (the sign of γ ), I compare economic development variables in landlord-dominated versus non-landlord-dominated districts, as shown in Appendix Table A .1. It shows that landlord-dominated areas are more backward today, with smaller proportions of villages having access to safe drinking water, electricity, paved road, medical facility, post and telephone facility, having lower labor productivity and agricultural wages. The underdevelopment in landlord districts could potentially not only lead to a higher demand for public jobs, but also a lower local capability to supply public jobs. Therefore, I cannot conclude from this comparison in which direction landlord areas are associated with NREGA job provision (i.e. the sign of γ is still unclear), which is especially because the empirical model already controls for all these observed economic development variables.
What I can conclude from this robustness check is, the true eect of land inequality on NREGA job provision will be stronger if landlord areas are directly associated with less NREGA provision through other mechanisms than land distribution. In the opposite, the true eect will be smaller if landlord areas are associated with more NREGA provision through other mechanisms than land distribution.
Alternative Measurements of NREGA Implementations
Both the OLS and IV results presented in the previous section use proportions of households provided with public employment to measure NREGA implementations. Table 8 presents in the IV sample show a slightly higher eect, around 1 percent. 2SLS results give an even higher estimate for Gini coecient, between 3-6 percents. The results using these alternative measurements are overall consistent with the estimates using household participation rate in NREGA.
Does Gini Coecient Capture the Top Distribution?Alternative Measurement of Land Inequality
As Gini coecients of land ownership reect the whole distribution of land holdings, a natural question arisesdoes gini coecient capture the top distribution of land ownership? It is after all the top, rather than the middle or bottom, distribution of land holdings that reects the concentration of big farms and big landlords' political power. Therefore, I construct shares of land owned by the top 10% largest land holdings to measure land inequality, following Besley and Burgess (2000) . As mentioned in previous section, land distribution data has information on the number and area of operational holdings across the following size bins (in 1000 hectares): below 0.5; 0.5-1; 1-2; 2-3; 3-4; 4-5; 5-7.5; 7.5-10; 10-20; 20 & above. I use the average size of land holdings in each bin to proximate land size in each group, then calculate shares of operated area for each decile of holdings. Figure 2 shows that the largest 10 percent of landlords own about 46 percent of the land area nationwide.
The scatter plot of Gini coecient and the shares of land owned by the top 10% land holdings in Figure 9 shows that these two measurements of land inequality have the same trends. The shares of land owned by the top 10% land holdings are higher wherever Gini coecients are greater. This provides descriptive support that dierences in Gini coecients between districts are able to capture the relative dierences of large landlords' land holdings. Then I use this alternative inequality measurement of land ownership distribution to re-estimate the eect of land inequality on public works provision. by the top 10% is 46 percent), the shares of households provided with NREGA jobs will decrease by 6 percent (or equivalent to 0.06 * 30%=1.8 percentage points, given that the average share of households participation is 30%). In addition, similar to using Gini coecient as the measurement of land inequality, 2SLS estimates have greater magnitudes than OLS estimates.
Is NREGA Demand Higher in More Equal Areas?
This paper mainly argues, those more equal areas have more public jobs provided to the rural poor because of the less interference of landlords, rather than through other means such as a higher demand for jobs. The previous sections conclude this argument by controlling for a series of demand side factors in the empirical model such as Backwardness Index and the percentage of agricultural labor. However, it is still important to examine the possibility of a higher demand for public jobs in areas with more equal land distributions, which will shed light upon what is driving the smaller job provision in these areas. As the sample size in the 2SLS estimation drops by two thirds compared to the original OLS sample, I examine the relation between gini coecient and economic development indicators separately for these two samples, and then explore how agricultural wages bias the estimated eect for each model. Table 11 shows the relation between gini coecient and economic development in the full sample. By some measures of economic indicators, such as the fractions of villages with access to electricity, paved road and schooling, areas with more equal land distributions (i.e. lower
The top panel in
Gini coecients) are less developed. Backwardness Index and agricultural productivity (Rupees per hectare), however, are about the same in areas with dierent levels of Gini coecients. In particular, agricultural wages, an important labor market variable, are slightly higher in these more equal areas.
With higher agricultural wages in private sectors, the demand for NREGA jobs is presumably lower in such areas, hence eliminating the concern that the higher participation rate in these areas are caused by job demand rather than job supply. Column 1 and 2 in Table 12 rearm this argument by showing that adding the additional covariate, agricultural wages, into the original OLS model does not change the estimated eect much, and in fact, it slightly raises the estimate.
The second panel in Table 11 shows that in the IV sample, other than literacy rates and access to schools, economic characteristics do not vary by Gini coecient at 10% signicant level. The fact that labor market characteristics are not worse in areas with more equal land distributions teases out the possibility that the higher NREGA participation in these equal areas is driven by a higher demand for public jobs. The comparisons in Column 3 and 4 (and Column 5 and 6) in Table 12 exclude the possibility that the higher provision of public jobs in the more equal areas is driven by a higher demand for public jobs, by showing that the local labor market (especially agricultural wages in the private sector) is not worse than that in the more unequal areas.
Investigating the relation between land inequality and public works provision is not only relevant
to India, but also has policy implementations for other developing countries, such as South Africa and Kenya, that have the dual need for job creation and investment in public services (such as road maintenance). More broadly, this paper adds to the discussion on how power asymmetries could hinder policies aimed at promoting equity. To improve policy eectiveness, the government needs to take into account asymmetries in bargaining power, which point is highlighted in 2017 World Bank Report (López-Calva et al., 2017) . Future research would provide a more complete understanding of the economic consequences of land inequality, and examine how power asymmetry begets economic inequality.
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